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THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY, BONUSES, AND LONG-TERM 
INCENTIVES ON FUTURE JOB PERFORMANCE
ABSTRACT
Extant compensation literature has indicated that pay-for-performance can influence 
employee performance. There is little research, however, that differentiates the effects of certain 
forms of pay-for-performance plans on future performance. By applying the precepts of 
expectancy theory to specific components of the pay-for-performance plans and using 
longitudinal data from a sample of 739 US employees in a service-related organization, this 
study demonstrates different effects for merit pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives.
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THE RELATIVE EFFECTS OF MERIT PAY, BONUSES, AND LONG-TERM 
INCENTIVES ON FUTURE JOB PERFORMANCE
The logic behind pay-for-performance compensation is that linking pay to performance 
can motivate individuals to achieve or sustain greater performance levels (Banker, Lee, Potter, & 
Srinivasan, 2001; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Heneman & Werner, 2005; Lawler, 1971, 1981; 
Schwab & Olson, 1990). As a result, a number of forms of pay-for-performance plans have 
emerged, with different mechanisms through which performance is linked to pay and with 
different methods of allocating awards (Milkovich & Newman, 2005; Schwab & Olson, 1990). 
In general, research has found that pay-for-performance plans do help achieve desired results, at 
both the individual level (Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; 
Eisenberger, Rhoades, & Cameron, 1999) and organizational level (Foulkes, 1980; Gerhart & 
Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988; Lawler, 1981); however, there are also 
instances of pay-for-performance plans did not seem to affect performance (e.g., Heneman & 
Werner,  2005; Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Kuvaas, 2006; Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985). 
Furthermore, despite the abundance of types of pay-for-performance plans, there are only a few 
instances of research that have sought to examine the potentially different effects that various 
forms of pay-for-performance may have (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 1990).  In this paper, we argue 
that the characteristics of pay-for-performance plans result in different effects on future job 
performance.  Specifically, drawing on expectancy theory, we expect that both the strength of the 
pay-for-performance relationship for a plan, and the nature of the type of reward offered by a 
plan, influences employees’ future job performance.
A weakness of compensation theory, and the compensation literature overall, is that while 
there may be clear implications for pay-for-performance plans in general, applications of theory 
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have not kept up with practice. That is, while theory has been applied to the understanding that 
pay-for-performance should have an effect on future performance levels, there has been little 
work to differentiate between the myriad of pay-for-performance plans that have emerged in 
practice.  This is both a notable practical and theoretical gap. Practically, organizations may 
believe that pay-for-performance can be beneficial, but the literature provides no clear guidance 
as to the relative effectiveness of the myriad of pay-for-performance plans available. 
Theoretically, because research has not applied (and therefore tested) the efficacy of theory for 
differentiating between pay-for-performance plans, there is little validated theoretical guidance 
with which we can predict how different pay-for-performance plans will affect employees. In 
this paper, we argue that we can draw upon expectancy theory to make specific predictions about 
the effects of various pay-for-performance plans, based on the characteristics of the specific 
compensation plans. 
Expectancy theory has been widely applied (Green, 1992; Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 
1981; Isaac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001; Johnson, 1991; Mitchell, 1979) among a number of theoretical 
approaches to job motivation (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 
1970; Ilgen et al., 1981; Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964). Popularized by Victor H. Vroom (1964), 
expectancy theory suggests that employees make rational decisions based on their subjective 
probability that their behavior will lead to certain outcomes and according to their perceptions 
associated with those outcomes (Mitchell & Daniels, 2003; Wahba & House, 1974). Originally, 
Vroom (1964) posited that motivation is a function of three beliefs: instrumentality (i.e., the 
belief that performance will lead to rewards and its associated outcomes; Turner, 2006; Vroom, 
1964), expectancy (i.e., the subjective probability of an action or effort leading to an outcome or 
performance; VanEerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964), and valence (i.e., all possible emotional 
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orientations toward outcomes, and it is interpreted as the importance, attractiveness, desirability, 
or anticipated satisfaction with outcomes; VanEerde & Thierry, 1996; Vroom, 1964). Subsequent 
research has simplified the model by subsuming instrumentality into expectancy because of the 
ambiguity of instrumentality to interpret and operationalize (Wahba & House, 1974). Therefore, 
the theory is generally operationalized as follows:
Motivation = Valence x Expectancy (1)
According to this formula, these two factors—valence and expectancy—which lead 
employees to choose types of behaviors and the level of effort, create motivation (Bonner & 
Sprinkle, 2002). Therefore, expectancy theory suggests that if we can approximate how pay 
plans differ with regard to these characteristics, we can predict (at least in part) work-related 
behaviors (Wahba & House, 1974). In this paper, we argue that we can use expectancy theory to 
understand the different effects associated with different pay-for-performance plans. We use the 
theory as a guide to understand why various pay-for-performance plans influence employee 
performance to different degrees. Because pay-for-performance plans (e.g., merit pay, bonuses, 
and long-term incentives) have different characteristics, the theory can help describe how the 
characteristics of these plans influence employee performance levels. In short, the purpose of this 
paper is to develop a better understanding of how different pay-for-performance plans influence 
employee performance levels.  
THREE FORMS OF PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PLANS
There are many forms of pay-for-performance (Milkovich & Newman, 2005), and while 
there has been research performed on many of these pay forms individually, there is very little 
research considering how multiple pay-for-performance plans may operate simultaneously. 
Because pay-for-performance plans have different characteristics, we can consider the 
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implications of these differences to make predictions as to the relative effects of three forms of 
pay-for-performance.
Merit Pay
Merit pay is a form of reward in which individuals receive permanent pay increases (i.e., 
raises) as a function of their individual performance ratings (Heneman & Werner, 2005). The pay 
plan is usually based on an individual’s performance and is assessed by an employee 
performance appraisal (Campbell, Champbell, & Chia, 1998; Schwab & Olson, 1990). Merit pay 
as pay-for-performance has been frequently used in organizations (Peck, 1984; Schwab & Olson, 
1990). Although it can be different across industries, a number of recent surveys have 
demonstrated that 80% to 90% of organizations use merit pay plans (Heneman & Werner, 2005).
A key characteristic of merit pay, compared to other forms of pay-for-performance, is 
that merit pay permanently increases employees’ base pay. This characteristic differentiates 
merit pay from the other forms of pay-for-performance that we discuss below. In terms of 
expectancy theory, all else equal, merit pay has the potential for greater valence than other pay 
plans. That is, from the employees’ point of view, because the present value of a $1 raise 
(permanent increase) is greater than the present value of a $1 bonus (a one-time payment, be it in 
the form of a lump-sum bonus or long-term incentive), the valence of a permanent increase 
should be greater than the valence of an equal dollar amount one-time payment. 
Despite the ways that merit pay may seem to incentivize employee performance, the 
effectiveness of merit pay has been repeatedly questioned (Campbell et al., 1998; Schwab & 
Olson, 1990). Some researchers have been concerned that organizations often failed to link merit 
pay to employees’ “true” performance because of measurement error associated with their 
performance appraisal system (Campbell et al., 1998; Schwab & Olson, 1990). In addition, the 
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difference in merit pay between the best and the worst performer is often not large (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1989). Moreover, such as shown by Kahn and Sherer’s study (1990), rewards 
from a merit pay plan may not actually be strongly associated with job performance ratings. 
These concerns, though, are not completely generalizable to all implementations of merit pay. 
Rather, when viewed through the lens of expectancy theory, they suggest that the merit play is 
often poorly implemented because they fail to generate expectancy. 
Bonuses
Bonus pay is a monetary reward given to employees in addition to their fixed 
compensation (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). This pay plan is also ostensibly based on 
individual performance, but bonuses do not increase employees’ base pay and therefore are not 
permanent (Sturman & Short, 2000). 
Bonus pay also has been widely used in organizations to motivate employees’ 
performance (Joseph & Kalwani, 1998; Sturman & Short, 2000), and a number of surveys 
reported that the popularity of bonus pay is increasing (Sturman & Short, 2000). Bonus pay is 
attractive from the company’s point of view because the one-time cash reward links pay to 
performance (Lawler, 1981; Lowery, Petty, & Thompson, 1996) but does not increase fixed 
labor costs (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Sturman & Short, 2000). 
Although bonus pay is flexible, it has similar potential problems to merit pay (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Lawler, 1981). Discretionary payment sometimes fails to provide a strong 
link between pay and employees’ true performance; it is also possible that the difference in 
rewards between performers may not be very significant (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989; Lawler, 
1981). Furthermore, because bonuses are one-time payments, they have less economic value than 
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permanent raises. In short, the effectiveness of the bonuses should also depend on the level of 
expectancy and valence of the compensation system.
Long-term Incentives
Long-term incentives (LTI) are rewards linked to a firm’s long-term growth as well as 
employee retention (Rousseau & Ho, 2000), generally in the form of cash or stocks (Rich & 
Larson, 1984). The length of the performance period in the pay plan is multiyear, whereas other 
pay plans are usually one year (Ellig, 1982). As such, long-term incentives have been thought to 
align managers’ and shareholders’ goals (Devers, Holcomb, Holmes, & Cannella, 2006; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, the pay plan can be a key factor for increasing managers’ 
performance and encouraging employees to adopt other desired behaviors (Jenkins, Mitra, 
Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). These incentives have been used to compensate managers, mostly top 
executives, with the hope of it leading to higher shareholder returns (Devers et al., 2006). Until 
recently, a large number of companies have offered long-term incentives in addition to the 
traditional annual bonuses mostly to executives (Pass, Robinson, & Ward, 2000); however, many 
firms have recently begun applying long-term incentive plans to other employees (Banker et al., 
2001; Buchholz, 1996; Hamilton, 1999; Karr, 1999; McClain, 1998; National Center for 
Employee Ownership, 2004; Pfeffer, 1998; Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991). 
A problem with long-term incentives, though, is the extent to which employees feel their 
performance is connected to the level of reward. Because long-term incentives are based on firm 
performance—and if in the form of stock awards, market performance—it is not always clear for 
employees to “see” the connections between their own performance and performance of other 
employees along with the firm’s objectives to achieve the firm’s goals (Boswell & Boudreau, 
2001). Because of this issue, companies have a tendency to limit long-term incentives to higher 
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level, and generally higher paid, employees (Bickford, 1981; Core & Guay, 2001; Ellig, 1982), 
who arguable have a more direct effect on firm performance. Nonetheless, the link between 
individual performance and long-term incentives may be weaker than for other forms of 
compensation, and thus may have lower expectancy than other forms of pay-for-performance.
Long-term incentives also generally have restrictions on their liquidity. That is, 
employees given long-term incentive awards generally cannot get immediate value from them 
because there are vesting requirements and/or restrictions on when the awards can be converted 
into cash. As a result, in many situations, gaining a long-term incentive award does not translate 
into a form of pay with immediate spendable value. Thus, there is also reason to suspect that, on 
a dollar-per-dollar basis, long-term incentives have less immediate value than immediately 
tangible rewards. 
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN THE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS PAY-FOR-
PERFORMANCE PLANS
Because pay-for-performance plans have different characteristics, their effects on job 
performance should likewise vary. By drawing on expectancy theory, we can understand these 
potentially different effect by considering (1) the link between pay and performance under each 
plan (i.e., expectancy), and (2) the nature of the awards from each plan (i.e., valence). Given all 
three pay-for-performance plans should have at least some aspect of both expectancy and 
valence, it is clear that expectancy theory yields the overall prediction that pay-for-performance 
plans will be associated with increased future job performance ratings. This expectation, though, 
does not truly draw upon the components of expectancy theory, nor does it differentiate between 
the various pay-for-performance plans. We therefore must turn to understanding the ways in 
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which expectancy theory suggests pay-for-performance plans should influence employee 
performance levels. 
Expectancy:  The Strength of the Link between Pay and Performance
As reviewed above, expectancy theory predicts that employee performance can be 
increased when a pay plan has a link between performance and rewards. Furthermore, the theory 
predicts that employees will have higher performance when there is a stronger link between pay 
and performance.  
While all pay-for-performance plans, by definition, should have some degree of 
connection between pay and performance, this is not always the case when such plans are 
implemented (e.g., Kahn & Sherer, 1990). A key difference between pay-for-performance plans 
is that the magnitude of this relationship (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). To understand the 
potentially different effects of pay-for-performance plans, we must therefore examine the various 
strengths of the associations between performance and rewards. If a one point improvement on a 
performance scale for a given individual is associated with a reward that is notably larger than 
the reward associated with comparable improvement in performance for a second individual, 
then (on average) we can expect that the former individual will have a stronger incentive to 
achieve higher future job performance than the latter.
For the purpose of developing hypotheses, the variability of pay plan characteristics 
makes it impossible to form a specific hypothesis about the degree of pay-for-performance of 
any given pay form in general. That is, the name of the pay form (e.g., merit pay, bonus, long-
term incentive) is essentially irrelevant; what is important are the characteristics of the pay plan. 
Therefore, based on the precepts of expectancy theory, we expect the following:
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Hypothesis 1: The strength of the connection between pay and performance will be positively  
associated with greater future employee job performance.
In other words, it is not simply that pay-for-performance should be associated with 
greater future job performance, but the degree of pay-for-performance should influence future 
job performance levels.
Valence:  The Value of Different Types of Rewards
For the purpose of comparing pay-for-performance plans, even if there are within-person 
differences with regard to employee perceptions of pay, characteristics of different plans should 
have some consistent across-person generalizations. As a result, regardless of how a given 
person is motivated by money, all else being equal, a larger reward should be perceived more 
positively than a smaller reward. For the first hypothesis, we could not make predictions based 
on the name of the pay form; however, when considering the effects associate with the type of 
reward, the name of the pay form conveys specific meaning with regard to the compensation that 
is offered.  
As described earlier, merit pay leads to permanent increases in base pay, whereas both 
bonuses and long term incentives lead to one-time payments. Therefore, we can expect whether 
the reward acquired by the employee is permanent (i.e., a raise), or a one-time payment (from 
bonus or LTI) will relate to the effectiveness of the pay-for-performance plan. That is, because 
the present value of a $1 raise (permanent increase) is greater than the present value of a $1 
bonus (a one-time payment), on a dollar per dollar basis, an equal increase in base pay is worth 
more than the one-time payment associated with bonuses or long-term incentives. 
The characteristics of long-term incentives also provide some insights into their potential 
effectiveness relative to bonuses. As mentioned earlier, there are often restrictions associated 
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with long-term incentives. As a result, in many situations, gaining a long-term incentive does not 
translate into a form of pay with immediate spendable value. The vesting or other restrictions 
makes the value of a long-term incentive smaller than a comparably sized cash award. Therefore, 
from an economic perspective, the liquidity of cash bonuses causes such rewards, on a dollar-
per-dollar basis, to have a greater present value than a comparably sized stock award. That is, a 
$1 award with immediate liquidity (i.e., a bonus) has more value than a $1 award with delayed 
liquidity (i.e., a LTI). This gives bonuses, on a dollar-per-dollar basis, more value than long-term 
incentives.
Expectancy theory purports that expectancy and valence interact. Put another way, 
valence moderates the effect of expectancy. Translating this proposition to the task of 
differentiating between pay-for-performance plans, we expect that the effect associated with the 
strength of the pay-for-performance relationship will be moderated by the value associated with 
the specific type of award. Because the rewards associated with the pay forms reviewed here 
have different values on a dollar-per-dollar basis (i.e., $1 raise > $1 bonus > $1 non-liquid 
bonus), drawing on the theoretical premise of expectancy theory that valence moderates 
expectancy, we expect the effect of the pay-for-performance relationship to vary. We therefore 
predict the following:
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect associated with the strength of a pay plan’s pay-for-
performance relationship will be greater for merit pay than for a bonus plan.
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect associated with the strength of a pay plan’s pay-for-
performance relationship will be greater for merit pay than for long term incentives.
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect associated with the strength of a pay plan’s pay-for-
performance relationship will be greater for a bonus plan than for long term incentives.
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METHOD
Sample
Data contained in the human resource information system from a service-related business 
were collected. For the analyses, data from the years 2003 and 2004 were used. Although the 
company had employees in other countries, this study focused on employees based in the United 
States because they are compensated under the same rewards systems. 
A sample of 739 employees who had completed data on performance ratings, salary, 
organization tenure, gender, race, and percentage of three financial rewards (merit pay, bonuses, 
and long-term incentives) were used. All employees in the sample were eligible for the three 
rewards although they did not necessarily receive them. 
Variables
Compensation variables
Before we can test our hypotheses, we will need to consider the link between pay and 
performance for the various plans in our study.  All employees in the sample were eligible for 
receiving the three rewards, in addition to their salaries. The financial rewards were determined 
by grids (which the company specified for each reward) and the discretion of the supervisor. The 
grids specified ranges of rewards (i.e., a performance rating of 4 could lead to a merit raise of 0 
% to 6 %), and thus the specific relationship between pay and performance varied within the 
sample for each type of incentive.
The merit pay plan was a raise based on individual performance and the guidelines of the 
specified grids. For the bonus pay plan, the company set targets, which were based on the pay 
band of the employee at the beginning of the year. The company paid bonuses which reflected 
the individual’s performance rating, the company’s financial performance, and the judgment of 
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the supervisor at the end of the year. Although both the merit pay and bonus pay plan were based 
on individual performance, allocations for these pay plans were also in part dependent on the 
decisions of the supervisor.  
The distribution of long-term incentives was also based on individual job performance, 
although the dollar value of these awards was also affected by the performance of the company’s 
stock. Each year, the company distributed restricted stock units to their employees based on a 
grant grid that the company had set. The grid allowed for differentiations based on individual 
performance and criticality of employees’ job position. At the time of the award, the restricted 
stock had no real market value. Rather, these stock grants would, at a future vesting date, “turn 
into” actual shares of the company’s real stock. In other words, when granted, the restricted stock 
had no immediately realizable monetary value (although it was expressed as such, based on the 
number of stocks and the current price of the company’s stock). Once vested, the award had the 
same market value as any other share of common stock from the organization. Employees of the 
company were educated about the financial rewards system via intranet, written communication, 
and training workshops.
Employee job performance
To predict the relationship between financial rewards and future performance, 2004 
performance ratings were used as the dependent variable. Performance ratings in the company in 
this study are based on a 4-point scale: significantly exceeds expectations, exceeds expectations, 
meets expectations, and below expectations. Performance ratings were transformed to indicator 
variables from 1 (lowest performance) to 4 (highest performance).
Control variable
14
 Because this study is examining the effect of financial rewards on employees’ future 
performance, previous performance (i.e., 2003 job performance rating) was used as a control 
variable. Using prior performance as a control variables partials out the effects of stable 
characteristics that caused employees’ performance (e.g., ability, job knowledge, motivation 
levels, or opportunities to perform) (Sturman, 2003; Sturman, Cheramie, & Cashen, 2005) and 
unmeasured effects that are attributable to omitted factors (for example, unmeasured ability) that 
might affect performance and pay (Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Sturman, 2007). 
Organization tenure was used as a control variable because it could interfere with testing 
the main effects of the different characteristics of financial rewards on future performance 
(Sturman, 2003). Gender differences have also been considered a potentially important factor 
causing pay difference (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). Therefore, to partial out the effects of 
these potential influences on future performance, gender was controlled in this study (with men 
coded as 0 [N = 389], and women coded as 1 [N = 350]). We also used dummy variables to 
control for race, grouping employees as white (89%, the omitted category), African American (N 
= 26), Asian (N = 31) or other (N = 25). Salary from 2003 was also controlled in this study. Note 
that because salary data is skewed, we used a log transformation to reduce the leverage of high 
values.
Employees were also classified as being in one of four bands.  Bands reflected the level 
of hierarchy in the compensation system. The employee’s band was used as a control variable in 
all subsequent analyses in the paper.
Analyses
Like Kahn and Sherer (1990), we used a two-step process to predict the impact of pay-
for-performance systems on employee performance levels. However, whereas Kahn and Sherer 
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(1990) examined merit pay and bonuses, we are also considering the effects of long-term 
incentives. The first step of our analyses examines the relationship between performance and 
pay; the second step looks at the relationship between the pay-for-performance link and future 
job performance.
Step 1:  Estimating the presence of expectancy
 To estimate the determinants of merit pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives - and more 
specifically to estimate the strength of the association between job performance and rewards - we 
used data on organization tenure, gender, race, 2003 salary, and 2003 performance on the 
resultant (same year) financial rewards (i.e., 2003). 
The method we used to approximate the pay-for-performance relationship of each 
compensation form is based on the method used by Kahn and Sherer (1990). In their paper, to 
capture differences in reward schedules, they estimated regression equations predicting rewards 
(in their case, merit percent and bonus percent) as a function of performance, control variables, 
and the interaction of performance with those control variables. They then used the first 
derivative of the results as a measure of each individual’s pay-for-performance relationship. In 
Kahn and Sherer (1990), the initial regression step involved predicting 1985 awards using 1984 
data. They then used the computed derivative as a predictor of performance in 1985. We used the 
same approach by estimating a regression predicting 2003 pay-for-performance outcomes as a 
function of 2003 performance (in our sample, the 2003 awards are the outcomes for that year, not 
the prior year), control variables, and the interaction of 2003 performance with all of these 
variables.  For merit pay, the resultant equation is as follows:
Meritpay =B0B1∗GenderB2∗TenureB3∗RaceB4∗2003 Perf .
B5∗2003 Perf .
2B6∗2003 Perf .∗GenderB7∗2003 Perf .∗Tenure
B8∗2003 Perf .∗Race
    (2)
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Where, Merit pay % = (2003 merit pay in dollars) / (2003 salary)
The same set of independent variables were then used to predict Bonus% and LTIP%, where
Bonuses %= (2003 bonuses in dollars) / (2003 salary)
LTIP% = (2003 long-term incentives in dollars) / (2003 salary)
We calculated the first derivative of this equation to represent the employees’ past experience 
with the pay-for-performance plans.  Expressed mathematically, 
PFPMerit≡ ∂  Meritpay 
∂ 2003 Perf .  (3)
This was specifically calculated as follows:
∂ B0B1∗GenderB2∗TenureB3∗RaceB4∗2003 Perf .B5∗2003 Perf . 
2
B6∗2003 Perf .∗GenderB7∗2003 Perf .∗TenureB8∗2003 Perf . ∗Race 
∂2003 Perf .
=B42∗B5∗ 2003 Perf . B6∗GenderB7∗TenureB8∗Race
The same method was employed to compute the other two measures of pay-for-performance:
PFPBonus≡ ∂  Bonus 
∂  2003 Perf .  (4)
PFPLTIP≡∂  Long−Term− Incentive 
∂ 2003 Perf .  (5)
Following the Kahn and Sherer (1990) method, the first derivative of these results were 
used as a measure of each individual’s pay-for-performance relationship for each pay form.
Step 2:  Analyzing the Effects of the Pay-for-Performance Relationships
In the second stage of our analyses, we examined the association between the pay-for-
performance link (i.e., from equations 3, 4, and 5 - along with the control variables of 2003 
performance, 2003 salary, organization tenure, gender, race, and pay band) to predict future 
performance (i.e., 2004 performance). The first step of the equation did not include the pay-for-
performance variables, as shown below in equation 6. 
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2004 Perf .=β0β1 2003 perf . β 2  Ln 2003 salary β3  tenure 
β4 Gender β5  Race β6  PayBand 
 (6)
The second step added the three pay-for-performance variables. This model is shown in Equation 
7.  All of the equations were estimated using OLS regression.
2004 Perf .= β0β1 2003 perf .  β 2  Ln 2003 salary β3  tenure  β4 Gender 
β5  Race β6  PayBand β 7  PFPMerit  β8  PFPBonuses β9  PFPLIP 
(7)
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, and ranges of the variables in this study are provided in 
Table 1.  Table 2 shows the correlations between the study’s variables.  
------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about Here
------------------------------------------
The regressions predicting the level of each award are shown in Table 3. For each pay-
for-performance outcome, the analyses regressed the pay-for-performance outcome on job 
performance and the control variables including performance interacted with all of the variables. 
This step is used not only to compare the relative effects of performance on the various outcomes 
but also to derive the first derivative, for the purpose of providing the pay-for-performance 
metrics used in subsequent analyses. 
------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 3 about Here
------------------------------------------
The three regressions show that, in all cases, job performance ratings were positively 
related to the size of the award. For merit pay and bonuses, the effect was positive and nonlinear 
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(for merit, B = .0023, p < .05; for bonus, B = .0027, p < .01). For long-term-incentives, the effect 
of performance was positive and linear (B = .51, p < .01).  
Table 4 shows results of regressions predicting future performance. Step 1 presents a base 
case, with 2004 performance regressed on prior (i.e., 2003) performance and the control 
variables. Step 2 uses the derivative-based metrics from Kahn and Sherer (1990) (from equations 
3, 4, and 5). As a set, the results support the hypotheses.
------------------------------------------
Insert Tables 4 about Here
------------------------------------------
Hypothesis 1 had predicted that a compensation plan with an association between pay 
and performance (i.e., a true pay-for-performance plan; or, a plan with expectancy) would have a 
positive effect on future performance. Our results show that all three pay-for-performance plans 
have a positive effect on future performance after controlling for prior performance and the other 
control variables.
The next two hypotheses predicted that the effect of pay-for-performance with permanent 
increases (i.e., merit pay) would have a larger effect than that associated with a comparable one-
time payout, from both bonuses (hypothesis 2) and long-term incentives (hypothesis 3). This too 
was supported. In step 2, using the set of pay-for-performance metrics, the coefficient for the 
merit plan was significantly greater than the coefficient for both the bonus plan (p < .001) and 
long-term incentives (p < .0001).  
Because of the restrictions on long-term incentives, Hypothesis 4 predicted that the effect 
of bonuses would be stronger than the effect of long-term incentives. The results support this 
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hypothesis as well. In step 2, the coefficient for bonuses was larger than the coefficient for long 
term incentives, and the difference was statistically significant (p < .0001).
DISCUSSION
As compensation packages become more complex, with individuals often being 
incentivized by multiple pay-for-performance systems, compensation research needs to at least 
keep up with (if not lead) compensation practice. This paper presents a test of the relative 
efficacy of three increasingly common pay-for-performance plans for influencing employees’ 
future performance levels. The hypotheses, based on expectancy theory, were supported, and 
thus uphold our overall prediction that the structure and form of pay-for-performance plans will 
have different effects on future performance levels. This is also the first paper to simultaneously 
compare the effects of merit pay, bonuses, and long-term incentives on employee performance 
ratings in a longitudinal context.
While there has been abundant previous research considering pay-for-performance plans, 
there has been little work specifically differentiating the type of effects we should expect from 
different forms of pay-for-performance. In general, expectancy theory suggests that a 
compensation plan with greater expectancy and greater valence should motivate employees to 
perform better. This suggests that by considering the expectancy and valence of different forms 
of compensation (i.e., different types of pay-for-performance plans), it is possible to differentiate 
between the types of effects we may expect from each. This study was able to look at the 
different effects associated with the particular components of the compensation system that 
simultaneously affect employees. As a result, this study draws on the generalizations of 
expectancy theory and the specific characteristics of three different financial rewards, and 
successfully predicts employees’ future performance by combining them. 
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The results of this study provided positive support for the hypotheses. As expected, the 
results from the first set of analyses indicate that individual performance is the most significant 
factor to determine financial rewards. In other words, performance levels in a given time period 
were indeed associated with the reward linked with different pay-for-performance plans in the 
same time period, thus making these plan genuine pay-for-performance plans and not just pay-
for-performance plans in name only. 
Because all three plans had a positive pay-for-performance relationship, hypothesis 1 
predicted that all pay-for-performance metrics would have a positive effect on future 
performance. That is, all the metrics capturing individual differences in reward schedules should 
have, and indeed did have, a positive relationship with future performance, even after controlling 
for the effects of prior performance ratings. Yet, because the rewards from the plans have 
different economic value due to the characteristics of each form of pay-for-performance, we 
predicted differential effects across the three plans. These predictions were also supported.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 were fully supported, with the results showing merit pay having a 
larger effect than that of both bonuses and long-term incentives. It should be pointed out that this 
result may at first seem inconsistent with that reported by Kahn and Sherer (1990), who showed 
a significant effect for bonus pay-for-performance, but not merit pay. In their study, though, the 
effect of performance on merit pay was minimal. Their regression predicting merit raise (an 
analysis similar to the first step in our analyses), had no significant effects associated with 
performance (main effect or interactions), whereas performance had a significant positive 
squared effect in our sample. Also, whereas Kahn and Sherer’s regression of merit pay predicted 
13% of the variance, in our sample, we were able to explain 45% of the variance. By itself, 
performance explains 37% of the variance in merit percent (the correlation between 2003 
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performance and merit pay percent, from table 2, is .61). Thus, this apparent contradiction 
between our results and those of Kahn and Sherer (1990) actually support and strengthens one of 
our key points:  it is the characteristics of the plan that cause it to affect performance levels, not 
the “name” of the plan. It appears that in the company studies by Kahn and Sherer (1990), what 
was called a merit pay plan was not really a pay-for-performance plan (because there appeared to 
be no relationship between pay and performance). As a result, the application of expectancy 
theory would have correctly predicted that, in their sample, Kahn and Sherer (1990) should have 
seen a positive effect for the bonus plan, but no effect for the so-called merit plan.
Hypothesis 4 was also supported. The coefficient associated with bonuses was indeed 
greater than that of long term incentives, and this difference was statistically significant. This 
finding further highlights the need for research to estimate the type of pay-for-performance 
relationships that exist under various pay plans. This sort of metric needs to be based on the 
characteristics of the plan or relationships derived from archival data, so that such metrics can be 
derived by organizations and used to help in the design of pay-for-performance plans. Doing so 
will help facilitate the design of more effective pay-for-performance systems, based on a strong 
theoretical foundation.
Overall, we feel that the sum of the results supports the applicability of expectancy theory 
for understanding the sort of effects that we should expect from different pay-for-performance 
plans. Our findings confirm the idea that greater expectancy and valence positively relate to 
future performance levels, even after controlling for prior performance. The theory also provides 
a clear explanation for the different results between our study and that of Kahn and Sherer (1990) 
while replicating their methodological approach. Our study also has the practical application that 
it provides a theoretically driven rationale to assist in the design of pay-for-performance systems, 
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highlighting the need for organizations to specifically consider (and empirically examine) the 
relationship that they ultimately create between pay and performance for each form of 
compensation they provide to their employees.
This research has a number of advantages over previous studies on pay-for-performance. 
First, it used longitudinal data controlling for prior performance to examine the effects of pay-
for-performance plans on future performance. Second, the study considered the different effects 
of the characteristics of multiple pay-for-performance plans simultaneously. The result was a 
conservative test on how pay-for-performance plans influence future performance levels.  
Of course like all research, this study is not without limitations. From a theoretical 
perspective, this study tested the generalizability of expectancy theory to the task of predicting 
the effects of pay-for-performance compensation systems. As such, we did not directly test the 
original prescriptions of expectancy theory—motivation. Nor did we assess individual 
perceptions of expectancy and valence; rather, the predictions were based on economic 
approximations from the relationship between pay and performance for expectancy and from the 
characteristics of the plans for valence. While this is not the first study to examine pay-for-
performance plans in this way (Kahn & Sherer, 1990), it is not a conventional test of expectancy 
theory. It is critical to point out, though, that one goal of this paper was to draw on theory to 
show how we could differentiate between the effects we expect from various pay-for-
performance plans.  
Methodologically, the study was limited by the longitudinal data being restricted to only 
two years in one company in one country. To detect a causal relationship that might exist, more 
periods should be tested in order to make conclusive statements (Kuvaas, 2006). It is also 
possible that company-specific characteristics (culture, industry, etc.) could influence the results. 
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Thus, examining these relationships in other contexts would provide useful information to 
further test the generalizability of our findings.
It would also be valuable to conduct more tests aimed at falsifying our application of 
expectancy theory. In this study, all the pay plans indeed had pay-for-performance relationships. 
An interesting test of our theoretical approach would be to test the effects of multiple pay forms 
when some are actually not linked to performance. The post-hoc explanation of Kahn and 
Sherer’s (1990) null results for merit pay provides some support in this way, but a priori testing 
would be preferable. Such a test would provide further evidence as to the veracity of our 
application of expectancy theory.
Understanding how the characteristics of compensation plans affect future performance is 
crucial for organizations to design effective pay-for-performance plans. This study makes an 
important contribution to the literature, not just by examining the relationships between pay-for-
performance plans and future performance, but by digging into the characteristics of pay-for-
performance plans. Yet, despite these contributions, the limitations in this study provide much 
room for future research. Further study should be pursued to clarify the influences on future 
performance and how different compensation plans affect employee performance over time. 
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TABLE 1
Summary of Sample
Characteristics Data
Gender Female: 47 %, Male: 53 %
Race 89% White, 4% Asian, 4% African 
American, 3% Other
Mean SD Range
2004 performance 2.30 0.58 1 - 4
2003 performance 2.43 0.64 1 - 4
2003 salary $78,415 24,977 $34,100-$244,400
Tenure 12.02 7.51 3 - 45
Merit pay % 2.09% 0.015% 0% - 6%
Bonus pay % 5.48% 0.046% 0% - 38.4%
LTI plan % 2.80% 0.10% 0% - 123%
PFPMerit 0.0048 0.0046 -0.0065 – 0.0188
PFPBonus 0.0026 0.0056 -0.021 – 0.021
PFPLTI 0.00019 0.030 -0.036 – 0.211
           Note.  N = 739
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TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
                                                            Note. N = 739.  Correlations greater than .08 are significant at p < .05.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. 2004 performance 1.00
2. 2003 performance 0.38 1.00
3. Ln 2003 salary 0.19 0.19 1.00
4. Tenure 0.00 -0.02 0.11 1.00
5.  Gender 0.02 -0.03 -0.22 0.09 1.00
6.  Race (White) 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.08 1.00
7.  Race (African American) -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.09 -0.59 1.00
8.  Race (Asian) -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.54 -0.04 1.00
9.  Race (Other) -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.53 -0.04 -0.04 1.00
10. Merit pay % 0.35 0.61 0.12 -0.12 -0.12 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 1.00
11. Bonus pay % 0.28 0.26 0.56 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.31 1.00
12. LTI plan % 0.18 0.14 0.48 -0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.74 1.00
13. PFPMerit 0.32 0.40 0.21 -0.28 -0.26 0.25 -0.29 0.07 -0.19 0.35 0.21 0.15 1.00
14. PFPBonus 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.12 -0.39 0.14 0.19 -0.17 -0.28 0.18 0.05 -0.16 0.31 1.00
15. PFPLTI 0.03 -0.06 0.24 0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.43 0.57 -0.01 -0.43
TABLE 3
First stage: Prediction of 2003 Rewards
Pay for Performance Component
Explanatory 
Variable Merit % Bonus% LTI%
Intercept 0.070(0.078)
0.12
(0.18)
1.219
(0.043)**
2003 Performance -0.033(0.029)
0.043
(0.074)
0.51
(0.17)**
Ln 2003 Salary -0.0048(0.007)
-0.0089
(0.016)
-0.012
(0.037)**
Gender 0.0011(0.0039)
-0.013
(0.0068)
-0.016
(0.016)
Tenure 0.00025(0.00027)*
0.00074
(0.00049)
0.0044
(0.0011)**
African American -0.0055(0.010)
0.019
(0.018)
0.018
(0.041)
Asian 0.012(0.0096)**
0.049
(0.017)**
0.0023
(0.039)
Other 0.010(0.012)
0.017
(0.019)
0.0033
(0.046)
2003 Performance2 0.0023(0.0011)*
0.0027
(0.0010)**
0.014
(0.0047)
2003 Performance x 
(Ln 2003 Salary)
0.0027
(0.0024)
0.0077
(0.0064)
0.058
(0.015)***
2003 Performance x 
Gender
-0.0014
(0.0014)
0.0046
(0.0027)
0.0080
(0.0064)
2003 Performance x 
Tenure
-0.00020
(.000096)**
-0.00042
(0.00020)*
-0.0022
(0.00047)***
2003 Performance x 
African American
0.0018
(0.0037)
-0.0080
(0.0074)
-0.0078
(0.017)
2003 Performance x 
Asian
-0.0068
(0.0034)****
-0.018
(0.0067)
0.00069
(0.016)
2003 Performance x 
Other
-0.0039
(0.0042)
-0.0051
(0.0082)
-0.0048
(0.019)
R2 0.45 0.78 0.75
Note. N = 739.  * p < .05; ** p < .01.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The table includes the 
interactions of 2003 job performance with all of the variables for the purpose of taking the derivative 
(with respect to job performance) so as to develop a metric for each employee of their respective pay-for-
performance relationships (i.e., replicating the methodology of Kahn and Sherer, 1990). 
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TABLE 4
Second stage: Prediction of 2004 Performance
Step 1 Step 2
Intercept
0.34
(1.08)*
-0.35
(0.81)
2003 Performance
0.32
(0.031)**
0.23
(0.034)**
Ln 2003Salary
0.12
(0.09)
0.16
(0.072)*
Gender
0.057
(0.041)
0.20
(0.050)**
Tenure
-0.00066
(0.0027)
0.00012
(0.0031)
African American
-0.063
(0.11)
0.025
(0.11)
Asian
-0.089
(0.041)
-0.08
(0.12)
Other
-0.093
(0.11)
0.18
(0.12)
PFPMerit
24.71
(6.08)**
PFPBonus
19.52
(6.24)**
PFPLTI
2.29
(0.91)*
R2 0.18 0.21
Note. N = 739.  * p < .05; ** p < .01.  
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